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Jeter, Lukas (M.S., Computer Science)
Review of the Usage of Security Mechanisms within the Android Operating System
Thesis directed by Associate Professor Shivakant Mishra
The Android operating system was designed to afford users secure, but unrestricted use of 
their device.  The crux of this solution is that the burden of system administrator has been, 
possibly unknowingly, placed upon each individual user.  The goal of this paper is to identify the 
significant threats Android users are faced with, and recommend possible solutions.
Through the course of this study, an Android application was developed and voluntarily 
downloaded, collecting a significant set of data from users.  This data, combined with additional 
literary and product research, has identified multiple shortcomings in the existing Android 
security landscape.  In particular, difficulty using the Permission mechanism, inconsistent 
communication regarding security patches and their distribution, and a general lack of usage of 
the user-controlled security features was identified. 
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1 CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
There is little question that, if used correctly and responsibly, the Android OS is highly 
secure.  It has been demonstrated, however, that the common user is quite susceptible to Trojan 
attacks and irresponsible or careless developers.  The Android OS's strength is built upon the idea 
that the user does not have traditional administrative access to their device, and that all installed 
applications are contained within their own process sandbox and must be granted access to all 
privileged resources explicitly at the time of installation.  The shortcoming of this model lies 
within the argument that the average user does not have the capacity to understand the 
implications of their security choices or chooses not to follow recommended practices.  Nor does 
it account for a well-intentioned developer who inadvertently makes resources available to 
malicious individuals who wish to exploit them.
This paper focuses on malicious attacks targeting an Android user.  Other attacks, such as 
those targeting cellular networks or distributed botnets, although in existence, are not reviewed.  
It is arguably the responsibility of the network providers and the target of a distributed denial of 
service to protect themselves against such attacks.  Instead, the protection of personal assets such 
as account numbers, money, and private information such as conversations and location data are 
discussed.  
Because the common user may not understand the implications of their security decisions, 
2the secondary goal of this project is to provide a minimal amount of device security education.  
The primary goal is to identify and quantify how much risk an average Android device user is 
exposed to.  This assessment is based on data collected from November 2010 through March 
2011 via a free Android application distributed on the Android Market.  The collected data 
includes device settings information and installed application permissions.  Not surprisingly, it 
was found that an overwhelming number of security settings have remained unaltered from their 
original defaults and that the majority of users failed to review the privacy disclosure prior to 
acceptance and usage of the application.
The data collected directly from users, combined with a study of the available 
documentation, shows three primary areas for concern:  First, most users are not actively using 
the security mechanisms made available to them.  Second, due in large part to its open nature, 
operating system updates and security patches can not currently be generated and distributed 
from a single source, and many users are using systems with known security flaws with no 
method of patching it themselves.  Lastly, the cornerstone of the Android security system, which 
is the security-by-permission mechanism is poorly documented and prone to mis-use by third-
party developers complicating its ability to serve end-users. 
Although the results themselves are not surprising, the collected data quantifies what has 
been a generally accepted fact for years: users are either disinterested or unaware of the 
computer security risks they are exposed to and frequently don't take advantage of the provided 
security tools.  Beyond that basic understanding is a question of what approach should be taken 
by software and hardware manufacturers to secure their customers' data, either from an 
economic, legal, or social perspective.  
3Instead of promoting the wide-held belief in the computer security community that users are 
ignorant and incapable of understanding the security concerns of the technology they use, it will 
be argued that the current structure disincentivizes users from making the recommended security 
evaluations and decisions.  Instead it is possible to see that the expense in time of security 
education far outweighs the intangible benefit of heightened security for typical users.  In order 
to achieve a higher level of security, it is necessary to either shift the burden to qualified 
administrators or to increase the tangible incentives for users to invest their limited resources in 
becoming more security-aware themselves.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: First a survey of related work is 
presented, including previous work that has been done on mobile device security and the 
psychology of security.  A brief introduction to the Android security model is then presented, 
followed by a discussion of common mobile device threats and how the Android model responds 
to each.  The next two chapters present the Android application used for the data collection and 
an analysis of the collected data.  The Other Considerations chapter discusses the psychological 
influences of using Android's security mechanisms, corporate influences, and impact of the 
mobile device market.  The following section presents a proposed model based on the collected 
information, which is then followed by a prediction of what may happen if things remain 
unchanged.  The remainder of the paper includes concluding remarks, the bibliography, and the 
appendixes containing supporting data.
4CHAPTER II
REVIEW OF RELATED WORKS
Android-specific security and usability:
Enck et al. (2009) have written numerous papers on the Android security framework, and 
have pointed out that although the security model is based on a solid foundation, it does pose 
drawbacks.  In particular, they outline both the pitfalls an Android application developer might 
encounter when trying to write secure programs, such as forging or eavesdropping of inter-
component communication messages that are either unnecessarily left public or are ill-formed.  
They also address the issue of whether or not the physical and cognitive demands placed on a 
user when evaluating security concerns during the installation of an application, which represents 
the first and arguably most important step of the Android security model, are within specified 
usability parameters and have proposed an enhanced version of the permission evaluation 
mechanism.  Although their solution does ease the security burden placed on the user, no 
evidence has been presented that it now falls within an acceptable usability range.  It should be 
noted, however, that more recent versions of the Android operating system and Google's Vendor 
application have reflected some of the features present in their Kirin application.  
They also specifically address the issue of applications securing their public interfaces from 
other, potentially malicious, applications (Ongtang et al., 2009).  The idea is that an application 
that exposes a public interface and secures it by defining a new permission can be compromised 
5in the same manner that any permission-protected resource can be misused.  Although their 
concern has merit, the bigger issue stems from the inability of users to effectively use the 
permission mechanism and for developers to effectively implement the Android framework in a 
secure manner.
Shin et al. (2010) presents a formal verification of the security of the Android permission 
system.  Through the course of their research, they exposed a flaw which was discovered  in 
Android's management of the mechanism, which has since been patched.  The flaw that they 
identified involved the timing of permission declarations with respect to application permission 
requests.
As Toninelli & Montanari (2009), state in their paper that the increasing ubiquity and 
personal relationship users have with their smartphones has shifted the responsibilities of a 
computer system administrator to the users themselves.  Their focus is on building a user-
maintained policy mechanism that maintains the integrity of their private information.  The self-
described challenge they face is to "design policy models that enable users to define machine 
readable policies in the same way they naturally think of their desired access control choices."  
Their research demonstrates a move toward making smartphone administrative tasks more 
intelligible to the common user.
A few projects have been focused on improving the Android security stack through the usage 
of SELinux, as presented by Shabtai et al. (2010).  Unfortunately, none of the reviewed papers 
have established a need or convincing argument for utilizing SELinux's available features within 
an Android context.  In particular, Android's unique implementation of assigning static user ids to 
applications at installation accomplishes much of the claimed advantages of an SELinux 
6implementation.  Additionally, the reviewed papers start with an assumption that one of the few 
running privileged processes are susceptible to attack, or that a user would be willing to invest 
the personal resources to implement finer-grained control over each application.  An example of 
the latter is provided in (Shabtai et al., 2010).  Namely, it assumes  that a user desires the ability 
to specify whether audio output goes to all available output devices or is limited to onboard 
controls, versus the possibility of being redirected to Bluetooth audio devices or GSM channels.  
Although this attack vector is legitimate, which is demonstrated throughout the paper, it can be 
argued that because users already struggle with the usability of existing mechanisms, adding 
finer-grained control will increase the system complexity and remain unused by the vast majority 
of users.  In another paper they present their own broad and exhaustive analysis and evaluation 
of the Android framework's security model and potential threats (Shabtai et al., 2010).
Security usability:
One of the interesting recommendations made by Shabtai et al. (2010) was to implement 
security policy based on device context such as location within their proposed solution.  Related 
to this idea is paper by Studer and Perrig (2010), in which they implement a solution that uses 
location information as part of an key to unlock encrypted resources.  Within their scenario, a 
cryptographic key is only available to unlock sensitive company files when the device is within a 
certain per-determined geographic location, such as their office.  One of their declared goals is to 
produce a security mechanism which requires no user effort and minimal administration 
involvement.
Metrics for the analysis of security usability are presented by Josang et al. (2007), and 
provide a basis for evaluating the security mechanisms in Android devices.  In particular, they 
7establish that any successful security system must prove tolerable by users with respect to both 
physical and mental burdens lest it remain unused.
Werlinger et al. (2009) present security usability issues from a larger, organizational 
approach.  The contributions made toward understanding the discrepancies between the different 
stakeholders responsible for designing a secure system to those responsible for using it are 
similar in Android.  When related to the findings of their paper, it is necessary to interpret the 
results with the understanding that Android users represent both end-users and security 
practitioners, while the Android framework designers represent the external IT organizations.
In his analysis of the psychology of security, West (2008) outlines some of the forces 
responsible for the security decisions that users make.  Among other factors, he points out that 
frequently making secure choices generally presents a barrier to task completion and that users 
tend to believe they are less likely then average to be victimized by an attack.  Additionally, he 
points to studies that demonstrate that users have a 'risk homeostasis' that suggests that as users 
increase their security measures they also increase their level of accepted risky behavior.  Lack of 
motivation, rather than ignorance or apathy, is also addressed as a contributor to user 
ambivalence toward computing security.
Herley presents a discussion of the economics of security, reasoning that security 
practitioners should view users as being shrewd and deliberate in their security decisions, rather 
than take the common view that they are ignorant and naïve (Herley, 2009).  In his paper, he 
demonstrates that the tangible cost of following common security advice is substantially greater 
than the theoretical loss potential of insecure computing practices.  This imbalance offers a 
clearer understanding of why consumers appear to habitually disregard common computer-
8related security advice.
Mobile device security:
Another perspective is presented by Sabzevar and Sousa (2008), wherein they postulate that 
with the explosive growth of the ubiquity of mobile devices and related 'remote control 
applications,' which allow a user to access various personal devices with their smartphone, these 
assessable services are also at heightened risk for attack.  Because of the diversity of the scope of 
these services, rather than presenting a single solution, they instead present guidance for the 
design and engineering of such systems.
Utilization of an anti-virus engine running in a cloud environment is presented by multiple 
research teams (Schmidt et al., 2009; Oberheide et al., 2008; Chow et al., 2010) in an effort to 
improve the power of traditional anti-malware software which is typically unusable by mobile 
devices' constrained resources.  Additionally, Cai et al. (2009) discuss some of the issues facing 
mobile devices and their built-in sensors.  In their discussion, they also present considerations for 
designing security to handle these additional threats.
Finally, Barrera and van Oorschot (pending publication) review the process of smartphone 
application development, distribution and installation among the major platforms, while 
Landman (2010) addresses general smartphone security from an enterprise perspective.
9CHAPTER III
THE ANDROID SECURITY MODEL
The Android Open Source Project framework is a software stack.  Each layer of the stack, as 
discussed below, groups together several programs that support specific functions of the 
operating system.
Figure 3.1: Android Framework diagram
Applications:  These include the main applications that the user interacts with while utilizing 
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the phone such as making phone calls, sending messages etc.  
Application Framework:  The application framework consists of various components that 
enable Android developers to create rich applications that leverage a mobile device's unique 
resources.  Some, like the Content Provider are key in providing extensibility to applications.
Libraries:  Android includes a set of C/C++ libraries that provide the core functionality to 
various components of the Android system.  These libraries are exposed to developers through 
the Android application programming interface.
Android Runtime:  Every Android application runs in its own process, with its own instance 
of the Dalvik virtual machine.  That is important for multiple reasons.  First, no application is 
dependent upon another.  This in turn ensures that if one application crashes other running 
applications should remain unaffected.  Another advantage is the simplification of memory 
management.  The ability to run multiple instances of the Dalvik VM is what enables the 
effective sandboxing of applications.
Linux Kernel:  Android makes use of the Linux version 2.6 for core system services.
The Core Application Components:
There are four primary building blocks that can comprise an android application:
1. Activity:  An Activity presents a unique visual user interface for each action performed or 
feature required by the user.
2. Service:  A Service is code that is initiated by an activity upon the request of the user.  
Services do not require being in the main thread of running.  How long a service runs is 
dependent on the user.  By contrast, an Activity's lifecycle is managed by the Android framework 
by default.
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3. A Broadcast Receiver:  This component is responsible for receiving and responding to 
broadcast announcements made by applications.  They are used to notify other packages of some 
action that has taken place.  This action can be initiated by an application or by the status of the 
phone itself.  The outcome of an announcement may vary depending on its nature.
4. Content Provider:  The content provider is responsible for enabling data sharing 
between applications.  It makes use of an SQLite database to store all of the data.  All 
applications make use of an object called ContentResolver to query the ContentProvider for 
desired information.  There are various permission issues related to this, which are discussed in 
the next section.
The first three components are activated by asynchronous messages called "Intents."  An 
Intent is essentially an object that contains a message which indicates what action is to be 
performed.  It can contain the name of the Activity or Service that it wants instantiated along 
with any filters or extra data.  Intents can be used to either explicitly name the desired target, or 
implicitly defined and rely on the Intent resolution mechanism to identify an appropriate 
installed application to handle the request.
User IDs and the Dalvik Virtual Machine:
In the Android operating system, security is primarily enforced via Linux group and User 
ID's.  On top of this, Android provides other security measures to make sure that security is 
enforced between the applications and the system.
No application, by default, has permission to perform any operations that would adversely 
impact other applications, the operating system, or the user (Google, 2011).  All Android 
applications are required to be signed with a certificate whose private key is held by their 
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developer.  This certificate can be used to identify the author of the application, if necessary, 
however certificates can be self-signed and no common repository of certificates linking them to 
their respective developer exists.
Each Android application is given its own unique Linux user ID during installation on the 
device, and runs within its own copy of the Dalvik virtual machine creating a sandbox for it and 
preventing it from affecting other applications adversely.  The user ID that is assigned to an 
application when it is installed remains unchanged for the lifetime of that application on the 
device.  Moreover, only applications that have the same ID may be allowed to run within the 
same process.  This ensures that a malicious application cannot utilize or compromise the data of 
a legitimate application beyond what is available to its own user ID or that of any application it 
controls.
Permissions:
Permissions are the primary form of fine-grained control used by Android to assure that no 
application is granted more access to resources than is deemed acceptable by the user and are 
required at different stages during the lifetime of an application:
◦ At the time of a call into the system, to prevent an application from executing certain 
functions.
◦ When starting an activity, to prevent applications from launching activities of other 
applications.
◦ To control who can send and receive a broadcast from you.
◦ When accessing and operating on a content provider.
◦ Binding or starting a service.
An important, but poorly documented feature of the Permission system is the required 
protectionLevel attribute.  Of the 139 Permissions declared within the Android framework, 62 of 
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them are either 'signature' or 'signatureOrSystem' meaning that they are only available to 
applications signed with the same certificate as the installed Android version or by applications 
included with the framework when it was installed.  The remaining 77 are available to third party 
application developers to access the devices' privileged resources.  In addition, any permission 
requested by an Android Manifest that has not been previously defined on the device will also be 
silently ignored at runtime.  See Table 3.1 for a categorized listing of default permissions and 
Table 3.2 for a breakdown of the Android Framework permissions available in version 2.3.
Value Meaning
"normal" The default value. A lower-risk permission that gives requesting 
applications access to isolated application-level features, with 
minimal risk to other applications, the system, or the user. The 
system automatically grants this type of permission to a requesting 
application at installation, without asking for the user's explicit 
approval (though the user always has the option to review these 
permissions before installing).
"dangerous" A higher-risk permission that would give a requesting application 
access to private user data or control over the device that can 
negatively impact the user. Because this type of permission 
introduces potential risk, the system may not automatically grant it to 
the requesting application. For example, any dangerous permissions 
requested by an application may be displayed to the user and require 
confirmation before proceeding, or some other approach may be 
taken to avoid the user automatically allowing the use of such 
facilities.
"signature" A permission that the system grants only if the requesting application 
is signed with the same certificate as the application that declared the 
permission. If the certificates match, the system automatically grants 
the permission without notifying the user or asking for the user's 
explicit approval.
"signatureOrSystem" A permission that the system grants only to applications that are in 
the Android system image or that are signed with the same 
certificates as those in the system image. Please avoid using this 
option, as the signature protection level should be sufficient for 
most needs and works regardless of exactly where applications are 
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installed. The "signatureOrSystem" permission is used for certain 
special situations where multiple vendors have applications built into 
a system image and need to share specific features explicitly because 
they are being built together.
Table 3.1: Android permission protection levels
Table 3.2: Count of permission protection levels
When an application is being installed, it is mandatory that it lists all of the resources that it 
wishes to access during its lifetime on the device.  These are listed in a document called a 
"manifest."  During installation, any “dangerous” Permissions requested by the application are 
granted to it via user interaction, otherwise the installation is aborted. “Normal” Permissions are 
not automatically displayed to the user for approval, but are viewable if desired.  Any Permission 
not declared on the device as well as the Permissions in the final two categories will be ignored 
during installation.  During runtime,  the Android framework will silently not grant the requested 
Permission to the requesting application, if it fails the check against the certificate signatures of 
the applications.
Other Security Features:
In addition, other security-related capabilities include a screen-lock pattern, the ability to hide 
either the screen lock patterns or passwords when being entered into the device, default 
Bluetooth timeouts, SIM card pins, password-protected credential storage, and a more recent 
Count of permission protection levels
dangerous 56
normal 21
signature 35
27
Total 139
protectionLevel Count
signatureOrSystem
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addition includes 'device administration'1 capabilities, which allows an administrator to enforce 
minimum password and timeout settings.
The Users' Role within the Android Security Framework:
Each user is expected to manage their own risk exposure.  As shown by the collected data, 
users appear to ignore the various available security features and instead choose to proceed in an 
insecure manner when using their devices.  As presented by (West, 2008 and Herley, 2009), this 
outcome should be expected given the incentive mechanism present within the Android security 
model.  Herley (2009) suggests that users typically make economically justifiable choices with 
regard to security, rather than simply disregarding security mechanisms for random reasons.  
The Permission mechanism can be considered the most important tool in the Android 
security stack.  Because of its complexity, however, substantial time and effort is required to 
learn the various 'dangerous' Permissions, and then to evaluate their legitimacy toward each new 
application.  The drawbacks to not adhering to the recommended security protocol are an 
intangible increase in protection from Trojans, which have demonstrated an insignificant 
presence within the past 2.5 years.  It should also be noted, that even conducting thorough due 
diligence will not offer guaranteed protection against Trojans, or vulnerable applications, further 
reducing the perceived benefit.  Evaluating the very real cost of time and effort versus the 
intangible and negligible added protection is a bad investment for typical users.  The Permission 
mechanism should not be eliminated altogether, however.  It can still be a very useful tool for 
those individuals who are more proficient in Android security to use in identifying potentially 
harmful applications, which in turn filters down to the Android user community as a method for 
limiting the damage that can be caused.  By way of example, a recent release of spoofed 
1 http://developer.android.com/guide/topics/admin/device-admin.html
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applications on the Android Market that contained a root exploit Trojan was initially identified 
by a user in early March 2011 who noticed a discrepancy in publisher names from the legitimate 
applications (Gingrich, 2011).
Device-level password protection presents a similar economic cost-benefit analysis.  First, a 
user must spend initial time to choose and set-up passwords for the various protected content, 
then additional inconvenience is borne each time the user uses a password-protected feature.  
Because passcodes can be shoulder-sniffed or even guessed by examining smudges present on 
screens (Aviv, 2010), and the fact that this attack also requires the acquisition of the device by 
the attacker, and finally, there is no guarantee that an attacker can't bypass the passwords to 
access data on the phone by other methods, the threat is theoretical and quite minimal when 
compared to the tangible costs of time and inconvenience.  Similarly, the ability to hide passcode 
input from shoulder-sniffing may be considered trivial when compared to the increased 
likelihood of the user entering an undetected mistake versus the marginal increase in protection 
offered when an attacker is watching the input actions.
In his paper, Herley (2009) aggregates the costs and benefits of taking recommended security 
precautions with respect to passwords, phishing, and certificate errors, showing that time spent 
attending to these security topics in excess of a few minutes per year is not economically 
efficient.  In one example, he points out that in the event of a stolen password, regardless of fault, 
many financial institutions have a policy of reimbursing customers of any financial loss, leaving 
the time spent resolving the issue as the only consumer cost.  It remains to be seen what actions 
will take place by the various entities (consumer, manufacturer, service provider, developer, 
Google as app distributor and framework designer, etc.) in the event an Android device consumer 
17
is negatively effected by data stolen from an Android device, however precedent has been set in 
other industries with businesses bearing most of the financial burden.
Summary:
The various in-built security measures of the Android make it very secure only as long as it is 
in the hands of a responsible user who understands the implications of various permission 
requests by different applications.  In addition, it requires competence on the part of an 
application developer to properly use the provided security measures.  The challenge lies in 
enforcing more security while not curtailing the freedom of the user to use their device in 
whatever manner they see fit.  
18
CHAPTER IV
GENERAL SECURITY THREATS & ANDROID'S RESPONSE
The types of attacks delivered by smart phone malware are as diverse as the devices 
themselves. Many of the discovered  malicious applications have done nothing at all and appear 
to be nothing more than proof of-concept tests, while others have delivered unexpected side 
effects such as localized denial of service via resource lock or abnormal battery drain. Other, 
more malicious attempts have been made to steal either service or data stored on the phone. 
Spyware is another example of the type of malware threat starting to reach mobile devices and 
can take advantage of built-in GPS receivers, microphones, and cameras to send information 
back to eavesdroppers.  Adware, on the other hand, can utilize a variety of available 
communication channels, such as MMS, SMS, IM, Email, or Bluetooth, to send unwanted 
advertisements to those people in a phone's address book, local vicinity, or even random numbers 
and addresses.
The following outlines the various attack vectors that can be employed by attackers to deliver 
their payload:
Trojans:
This category poses the largest vulnerability risk to the Android user, because of the devices' 
unrestricted capabilities to utilize on-board resources and the necessity of common users to 
assume to role of device administrator.  The ease with which to create applications combined 
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with liberal and unchecked distribution channels makes the Android platform an ideal target for 
malicious individuals.  Rather than searching for and exploiting a vulnerability within the 
framework, a criminal can hide his malicious payload within a seemingly legitimate application.  
Each user has the burden of determining the legitimacy of applications prior to installation 
primarily by evaluating the requested permissions and the developers' reputation.
A recently discovered Trojan attack involved repackaging popular applications to also 
include malicious background services and then distributing these new packages via alternative 
markets; in particular markets where the legitimate copy of the application is not already present 
or by offering an application that has similar functionality to a popular application with a slightly 
altered name.2  Frequently, the malicious version of the application requests additional 
permissions in order to execute these additional malicious activities, however this will not 
always be necessary depending on the attacked applications desired functionality.  Safeguards 
against this type of attack involve downloading applications from only trusted distributors, such 
as the Android Market, however doing so still provides no guarantee of an application's 
legitimacy.  Additionally, it has been noted that Google monitors the applications listed on their 
Android Marketplace, as first evidenced by the removal of an application used for researching 
the effectiveness of distributing a Trojan via the Marketplace and the subsequent usage of the 
'remote application removal feature' to remove the application from users' devices (Bray, 2011).
Traditional anti-virus applications provide an additional layer of defense for discovered 
malware, however the effectiveness of the software relies on the anti-malware company 
effectively identifying malicious applications and distributing patches.  Oberheide et al. (2008) 
2 http://blog.mylookout.com/2011/02/security-alert-hongtoutou-new-android-trojan-found-in-
china/
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have demonstrated that it takes 48 days on average from zero-day to the time that anti-malware 
companies identify and include the new malware's signature in their data files.
The built-in counter-measure for Android users is the employment of the sandboxing and 
permission mechanism, which if used properly prevents applications from accessing privileged 
assets.  However, this mechanism was not always adequately implemented as evidenced by the 
discovery of improperly implemented permission checking in Enck et al. (2009).   
Application-level exploits:
As with any software, exploitable bugs can exist.  Similar to malicious applications 
containing Trojans, the attacker's control of the device is confined to the resources originally 
granted to the exploited application.  By way of example, two exploits have been discovered 
with the Webkit web browser.  Although exploitable, any attacker would be limited to operate 
within the same Dalvik virtual machine sandbox granted to the Webkit browser.  Namely, an 
attacker could blindly search the contents of the external storage media or initiate downloads via 
the Internet, however the attacker would be unable to install newly download malware or affect 
GSM or SMS features.
Ultimately this attack vector depends on the competence of the developer, and the burden of 
evaluating the quality of each application's developer is borne by the user.  An added protection 
afforded to users of Google's Android Marketplace, is the ability to enable automatic application 
updates, and notification of existing updates if this feature is turned off.  
Phishing attacks:
The general awareness of phishing attacks has been increasing in recent years, largely due to 
the increased amount of user education from on-line vendors.  Traditional phishing works in the 
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same manner on smart phones as it does on traditional computers, however attackers can 
leverage the unique characteristics of these smaller devices to increase their effectiveness.  In 
particular, smartphones have much smaller displays with which to communicate current security 
settings when visiting various websites.  In addition, attackers can take advantage of the fact that 
the default Android web browser allows the address bar to scroll off the screen, along with the 
browser's lock icon signifying a secure connection.  Tap-jacking is another method of taking 
advantage of the small browsers available on smartphones by overlaying a transparent iFrame 
over another website in order to fool users into selecting malicious controls (Rydstedt et al., 
2010).
Smshing is a related attack that uses forged text messages in an effort to acquire personal 
information from its victims.  Unlike the aforementioned education surrounding email-delivered 
phishing attacks, education regarding smshing attacks is virtually non-existent leaving users 
much more susceptible to suspicious SMS messages.
There is currently no known Android-specific anti-phishing mechanism, and the only 
effective defense is continued education regarding this type of attack.
Physical attacks:
Unless proper precautions are taken, all data stored on a smartphone is susceptible to misuse, 
in the event of theft. Various techniques used to reduce this possibility include use of an 
encrypted file system and device passwords.  Some security applications offer the user the ability 
to remotely wipe, lock, locate or disable stolen devices.  If in physical possession of a stolen 
device, it is highly likely that an attacker can then use known system exploits to root the device 
and gain complete control of the device and access to the stored data.  It has also been recently 
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demonstrated that examining smudges on a device's touch screen allowed testers to correctly 
identify a lock pattern thereby illustrating a shortcoming of that particular security mechanism 
(Aviv et al., 2010).
Another physical attack involves an attacker peeking at a user's screen when sensitive 
information is being displayed, which is commonly referred to as shoulder sniffing. In addition 
to acquiring device passwords, attackers can also use this method to obtain passwords to other 
sensitive information such as email or bank accounts.  Android features that can be employed to 
discourage this type of attack include disabling visible on-screen display of unlock pattern and 
last-typed character of passwords.
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CHAPTER V
KNOWN EXPLOITS AND THE SECURITY PATCHING MECHANISM
Discovered security issues - Android framework:
The first security update occurred within days of the release of the first Android device in 
October 2008 (Gohring, 2011).  A vulnerability was discovered in an outdated version of the 
WebKit browser that was included as part of the Android framework and allowed an attacker to 
gain access to any information used or entered by a user into her browser.  The exploit was a 
known vulnerability and had been patched in more recent versions of the open source Webkit 
browser engine, but had not been incorporated into the Android build.  Because of the existing 
Android security sandboxing mechanism, the exploit's impact was limited to the browser 
application and an attacker would be unable to access any other aspect of the phone such as the 
phone's dialer or contact information.  
At the time, only one carrier and manufacturer existed making the patch a trivial matter to 
distribute (Gohrin, 2008).  It is significant to note, however, that this first security patch release 
required coordination between Google, the operating system provider; HTC, the hardware 
manufacturer; and T-Mobile, the carrier to create and distribute a patch to end users.  As the 
Android operating system became deployed on more devices, the burden of implementing and 
distributing security patches still requires the coordination of manufacturer and carrier.  This now 
entails more than 50 commercial manufacturers and numerous carriers who offer devices 
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installed with their own version of the Android operating system.3
Through the course of their research, Enck et al. (2009) discovered multiple instances of the 
Android system not properly checking for required permissions to access protected assets or an 
absence of a permission for what should be a protected asset.  Upon notification of these 
oversights, Google has patched the permission-checking holes.  Another Webkit vulnerability 
allowing the execution of malicious code through the use of JavaScript embedded within 
malicious websites was more recently discovered and currently affects browsers included in 
Android versions below 2.2.2 (Gingrich, 2011).  Because the browser is included within the 
Android framework, possible recommended remedies for users are to disable JavaScript until 
their vendor distributes a patch or to install and use a different web browser.
A current potential exploit vector consists of the management of data stored on the SD Card 
or owned by the browser application (Cannon, 2011 and Metasploit, 2011).  Because cards are 
formatted as FAT32, the concept of file permissions does not exist, making it possible for any 
application having the android.permission.SDCARD permission to access any data, such as 
pictures and movies.  The difficulty for an attacker exploiting this bug, however, is that it is not 
possible to get a list of directories and files contained on the SD card, instead they need to know 
the name of a desired file in order to access it.
Additionally, "rooting" a device involves exploiting a security vulnerability found within the 
Android framework to gain escalated privileges.  Once accomplished, users are able to overwrite 
the bootloader, which is locked on most device distributions, in order to install a customized 
"mod," or modified operating system.  As is the case with many exploits, each of the Android 
exploits involves a coding oversight that fails to perform a check prior to granting a user process 
3 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Android_devices/
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root privileges.  After discovery, the bugs are fixed and incorporated into future releases, 
however it may also be possible to overwrite the installed system ROM with a previous and 
unpatched version that can then be exploited.  It should also be noted that exploits targeted at a 
particular version of the Android framework may or may not work on any given hardware due to 
some manufacturers' altering of some of the system files and functionality which may affect the 
exploit code.
Discovered security issues - Android Applications:
Lookout, an Android anti-malware application, issued a notice in February 2011, alerting 
users that an exploit was discovered in their application and that it was necessary to upgrade to 
the next version to secure their devices.  Because applications run in a consistent environment 
within the Android framework, it is possible to distribute newer application versions in a more 
efficient manner, than relying on framework updates.  For applications distributed through the 
Android Marketplace, it is also possible to enable automatic updating, further easing the burden 
on the user.
Although details do not appear to be publicly available, "Lookout recently patched a security 
vulnerability in their Android app. The vulnerability, which was first reported by Tavis Ormandy 
of the Google Security Team, is not known to have compromised any devices or user data. 
Lookout worked with Google to fix the problem and release an update through the Android 
Market and other distribution points.”4  This demonstrates that not only should users be 
concerned about the security of the Android operating system, malicious individuals, and 
potentially untrustworthy developers, but also indicates that well-respected developers can fall 
4 Wyatt, T.; "Lookout Security Vulnerability Patched in Android Release 5.1.1," 
http://blog.mylookout.com/2011/02/lookout-security-vulnerability-patched-in-android-release-5-
1-1/, cited March 31, 2011.
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victim to security oversights.  The situation was handled by a public announcement that does not 
reveal the nature of the vulnerability, but instead advises users to update their application and 
provides instructions regarding the method for checking their application's current version.
Most recently, Trojans have begun surfacing within alternative application markets in China, 
as well as on the official Android Marketplace operated by Google.  In one attack, 58 
applications using code stolen from various popular applications and then having the 
"rageagainstthecage" exploit hidden within their code were distributed to an estimate 200,000 
users via the Android Marketplace in approximately 4 days before they were removed from the 
Marketplace (Gingrich, 2011).  This well-known exploit, frequently used by individuals to gain 
'root' access of their device in order to unlock bootloaders, was patched in Android OS version 
2.2.2.  Unfortunately, as of April 6, 2011, between 33% and 97% of current Android users were 
using a vulnerable version (it is not possible to calculate more accurately because all 2.2.X 
versions are reported collectively as 63.9% of users).5  This assessment also assumes that 
manufacturers are providing security patches only with version upgrades rather than standalone 
security patches, which cannot be confirmed or denied with available information.  
 In response to this attack, the Google Android team released a new application titled 
"Android Market Security Tool March 2011," which was designed to undo the negative side 
effects of the discovered Trojan by uninstalling the malicious software.  The patch was 
automatically pushed to known affected users and published to the Android Marketplace.  In 
addition, there are reports that Google is now working more proactively with device 
manufacturers to deliver security patches that were made available in the Android Open Source 
Project code in November 2010 to device end-users (Messmer, 2011).
5 http://developer.android.com/resources/dashboard/platform-versions.html
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As an ironic twist to this highly publicized security problem, a new Trojan was recently 
discovered in a Chinese application store titled "Android Market Security Tool."6   Based on 
initial evaluation of the payload, the application does not take advantage of any existing exploit, 
but instead is designed to distribute SMS messages when instructed to by a command-and-
control server, which falls within the guidelines of the allowed permissions contained within the 
application's manifest.
Android Security Patches:
The Android operating system is unique from many other operating systems in the way that it 
is distributed.  The core framework was developed and distributed to device manufacturers by 
Google, Inc.  A version has also been released to the open source community for further 
development, but it has been stripped of any proprietary source code.  Manufacturers are then 
able to modify the framework themselves, optimizing the platform for their hardware or adding 
increased functionality.  Others are also able to modify the framework and deploy the resulting 
operating system on any hardware they desire, which has led to a large number of "mods," or 
modified Android frameworks ROMs.
This method of distribution has resulted in a non-traditional mechanism for distributing 
security patches.  Unlike many other common ubiquitous operating systems that can either push 
updates to users or allow them to configure their systems to routinely check for system updates, 
because the core operating system files are unaltered, no such guarantee exists for the end users 
of devices using Android.  As indicated by the Security FAQ page of the Android Developer 
website, "The manufacturer of each device is responsible for distributing software upgrades for 
6  http://www.symantec.com/connect/ko/blogs/androidbgserv-found-fake-google-security-
patch
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it, including security fixes."7  It is therefore necessary for the maintainers of each flavor of the 
Android framework to implement or update their version and then push those patches to the end 
user to assure that the patch is effective or does not break part of the framework.  Through the 
course of the study, 225 different versions of Android were counted among the 674 data files 
received; see Appendix A for a listing of each unique build name.  This makes the user 
unknowingly dependent on the maintainer of their Android distribution for any security patches, 
which can lead to extreme vulnerability in the case where a maintainer is no longer providing 
support for the operating system or is unaware of the existing security issue.
Also discussed on the Android Security FAQ web page, and an active recent discussion on 
the android-security-discuss mailing list, is the method for notifying the Android platform 
developer community of any identified and patched security problems: "In addition, we will add 
security fixes to the open source distribution of Android and publicly announce the changes on 
android-security-announce."  The security patch mechanism, which relies heavily on voluntary 
manufacturer and carrier implementation,8 has been the target of a significant amount of criticism 
lately.9  The discussion subject on the android-security-discuss mailing list is the fact that the 
android-security-announce mailing list has received only one posting: an introduction of the 
Android security team, which was posted August 18, 2008, two months prior to the first release 
of an Android device.  The lack of posting is not due to a lack of security fixes, but some other 
reason which has remained undisclosed.  Presumably, manufacturers of officially licensed 
Android versions are receiving security patch notifications directly from Google, however, this 
7  http://developer.android.com/guide/appendix/faq/security.html
8 http://developer.android.com/resources/faq/security.html
9 http://groups.google.com/group/android-security-
discuss/browse_thread/thread/c83fc3392ba08dcf
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leaves the user of other versions of the Android operating system inadvertently exposed if the 
maintainer of their distribution is also unaware of the necessary fix (Rahim, 2011).
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CHAPTER VI
THE “SECURITY TEST” APPLICATION
The Security Test application was written to address two primary concerns: first, to quantify 
the generally-accepted notion that users are unaware of the security threats facing their usage of 
Android devices making them vulnerable to attack, and second, to provide some basic 
educational material to raise their security awareness and thus making them less vulnerable to 
attack.  After accepting the Privacy Disclosure, which is split between two pop-up windows, the 
user is presented with the main menu.  Available on the main menu are the options "Test Your 
Phone," "Test Your Knowledge," "Submit Some Helpful Info," and "About This Project."
Figure 6.1: Security Test entry screen           Figure 6.2: Security Test results screen
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The "Test Your Phone" option collects various phone setting data and reports back to the user 
common security settings along with a general indication of the level of security their current 
setting provides.  Also included in the user report is a list of selected high-risk permissions and 
any installed applications that have declared the permission.  The user is also able to learn more 
about each general category by selecting the adjoining "Learn More" button.  All collected data 
was saved to a file and uploaded to a secure server.
The data collected from each phone includes the randomly assigned device identifier, the 
Android version name, a list of the installed applications and their related permissions, and many 
of the settings data available within the android.provider.Settings.System and 
android.provider.Settings.Secure classes.  A listing of the collected settings and their descriptions 
can be found in Appendix B.
In the "Test Your Knowledge" section the user is presented with a sub-menu, as shown in 
figure 6.3, with six categories of questions.  Within each category the user is presented with three 
to five multiple-choice questions and the users' answers are recorded and transmitted to the 
secure server when they are done with the quiz section.  A complete listing of the questions, 
along with collected user responses can be found in Appendix C.
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    Figure 6.3: Security Test quiz category list
A short list of demographic questions are asked within the "Submit Some Helpful Info" 
section, while the "About" portion of the application provides limited additional information 
about this research project.  
During the time that the application was made available on the Android Marketplace, which 
lasted from November 2010 to March 2011, the Security Test application was installed 636 total 
times, with 140 active installations at the time of publication.  Because of the informative nature 
of the application, it is not surprising that 78% of users removed the application from their 
devices after reviewing all of the material.  In addition, only two ratings were received, both of 
which were “5 stars,” with the first rating being posted by the author.  The application also 
received a single comment during its availability:
by (January 6, 2011)
Seems like a nice effort to raise awareness about issues of security. :)
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CHAPTER VII
ANALYSIS OF THE DATA
All of the collected data was submitted by individuals who voluntarily installed, accepted the 
Privacy Disclosure, and ran the Security Test application.  No administered control over the test 
group existed, and because of the minimal amount of demographic data reported, few 
conclusions about the characteristics of the users exist.  Without clear indication of users' 
motivation for using the Security Test application, it is reasonable to assume that the data is 
skewed toward individuals already interested in Android security topics, and also influenced by 
other security researchers or watchdog groups who make a habit of downloading and reviewing 
all applications placed on the Android Marketplace.  It is therefore not expected that these results 
are a true reflection of the entire Android user population, but instead they can be used as an 
additional resource when considering users' security habits.
None of the results of the collected data were overwhelmingly surprising. As shown in table 
7.1, the majority of users (87%) accepted the Privacy Disclosure prior to reaching the page 
explaining what data would be collected and how it would be used.  Most of the default security 
settings were left unaltered, as evidenced by the overwhelming number of null settings values.  If 
the answers submitted via the quiz section of the application can be assumed as representative of 
the cumulative Android user knowledge base, it can be concluded that there is a general 
understanding of most of the major security topics affecting them.  One significant shortcoming 
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identified in the quiz responses, however, centered around Android Permissions topic.
Table 7.1: Security Test privacy disclosure acceptance
Demographic data:
An insignificant number of voluntary demographic information were submitted by devces 
with unique identification numbers.  Of the 24 submissions, the data was widely distributed, not 
offering the ability to apply any demographic stereotypes or associations to the other collected 
data.  In addition to the four topics summarized in the Appendix D tables, users were also asked 
about their motivations to purchase their device and to install the Security Test application. 
Users were also requested to rate the frequency of device usage for various activities, such as 
sending email, taking videos and pictures, looking up directions, and using social media 
applications.  As with the other reported data, responses were minimal and distributed without 
any discernible pattern.
Quiz data:
The totaled data in Appendix C includes only the first response to a given question from each 
unique device identification number.  The decision to use only the first responses was made to 
demonstrate what users may have known before reviewing the educational sections of the 
Security Test application and to filter answers that may have been learned as a response to 
previously reading the questions' answers.  In general, the quiz section of the application was 
intended to be an engagement tool and to reinforce the security topics, and were not expected to 
Privacy disclosure acceptance
Accepted without viewing second page of the disclosure: 336 87%
Viewed second page of disclosure: 43 11%
Viewed second page and returned to page 1 before accepting: 6 2%
Total users: 385 100%
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be a conclusive method for testing users' knowledge.  The delivery format and uncontrolled 
testing environments could not provide adequate testing conditions for a true scientifically-
designed survey.  Additionally, an average of only about 50 responses were received for each 
individual question, which is an insignificant number to draw definitive conclusions given the 
amount of possible noise from users who installed the application for a non-intended purpose.
The collected quiz answer data does, however, allow some useful observations to be made.  
For example, most questions achieved a correct answer response rate above 50%, with the 
exception of the three questions regarding Android Permissions.  Conversely, an overwhelming 
majority of respondents indicated awareness that installed applications could effect other 
applications, intercept SMS, and unintentionally introduce security vulnerabilities.  Not 
surprisingly, questions that appeared to have the most uncertainty had to do with technical 
features such as the usage of developer certificates and whether applications on the Android 
Market are vetted.
Again, the observations listed above appear do indicate a general awareness of some of the 
more important topics, in the absence of statistically conclusive evidence.  Factors that may have 
impacted these results include the relatively small sample size, the wording of the questions and 
answers, and the lack of control over the test group allowing for the inclusion of application 
testers, honeypots, and even other researchers.
Permission data:
Contained within this data set is the collection of permissions declared in the Android 
Manifests of 8,711 unique applications across 381 unique devices, for a total of more than 
65,000 unique application instances.  There are only 115 "android.permission.XXX" declared in 
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the public Android SDK Level 10 API (version 2.3.3), whereas 320 permissions with the 
android.permission prefix were reported as requested in the manifests of installed applications.  
In many cases these additional permissions were obvious typos, or possibly attempts to guess an 
API permission name, such as "ACCESSS_COARSE_LOCATION" or 
"ACCESS_COURSE_LOCATION."  At a minimum, this is a clear demonstration of the volume 
of sloppy code and lack of adherence to recommended Android development best practices that 
persists within Android applications, and at worst these random permissions can be paired with a 
permission declaration at a later point offering unpredictable results and potential exploits in 
some earlier Android versions.
As discussed in Chapter 3, within the Android permission mechanism, each permission is 
required to declare a protection level that designates what applications are able to use it and 
represents how much relative danger it may pose to the user; see tables 3.1 and 3.2.  Contained 
within Appendix E is a complete listing of the permissions declared within the Android 
Framework as of version 2.3.3.  To further illustrate the potential for confusion and 
misunderstanding regarding this vital piece of the Android security system, only the permissions 
labeled “hidden from API” in Appendix E are not seen by developers.  Many of the “signature” 
and “signatureOrSystem” are visible, however they are unavailable to developers not involved 
with framework implementation, and the “protectionLevel” property of the framework 
permissions are not readily available within the public API.  Shown in the following 4 tables is 
the frequency of each framework permission grouped by protection level for the 150 packages 
which were installed on more than 100 unique devices; see Appendix F for a listing.
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Table 7.2: Frequency of “normal” protection level permissions.
Permission Group
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE NETWORK 58 39%
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED SYSTEM_TOOLS 53 35%
GET_ACCOUNTS ACCOUNTS 45 30%
VIBRATE HARDWARE_CONTROLS 43 29%
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS 37 25%
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE NETWORK 30 20%
BROADCAST_STICKY SYSTEM_TOOLS 17 11%
READ_SYNC_STATS SYSTEM_TOOLS 15 10%
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ SYSTEM_TOOLS 11 7%
SET_WALLPAPER SYSTEM_TOOLS 9 6%
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR SYSTEM_TOOLS 6 4%
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS LOCATION 5 3%
KILL_BACKGROUND_PROCESSES SYSTEM_TOOLS 5 3%
RESTART_PACKAGES SYSTEM_TOOLS 5 3%
WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY PERSONAL_INFO 5 3%
BATTERY_STATS 4 3%
ACCESS_WIMAX_STATE NETWORK 3 2%
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS SYSTEM_TOOLS 3 2%
FLASHLIGHT HARDWARE_CONTROLS 2 1%
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE SYSTEM_TOOLS 2 1%
SET_ALARM PERSONAL_INFO 0 0%
“normal” permissions present in applications 150 most-installed apps
# of apps % of installed apps
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Table 7.3: Frequency of “dangerous” protection level permissions.
Permission Group
INTERNET NETWORK 87 58%
WAKE_LOCK SYSTEM_TOOLS 61 41%
WRITE_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS 59 39%
READ_PHONE_STATE PHONE_CALLS 53 35%
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE STORAGE 50 33%
READ_CONTACTS PERSONAL_INFO 41 27%
WRITE_CONTACTS PERSONAL_INFO 32 21%
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS ACCOUNTS 31 21%
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS 31 21%
USE_CREDENTIALS ACCOUNTS 28 19%
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION LOCATION 24 16%
CALL_PHONE COST_MONEY 23 15%
READ_SMS MESSAGES 23 15%
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION LOCATION 22 15%
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS HARDWARE_CONTROLS 20 13%
READ_CALENDAR PERSONAL_INFO 19 13%
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS ACCOUNTS 18 12%
GET_TASKS SYSTEM_TOOLS 18 12%
DISABLE_KEYGUARD SYSTEM_TOOLS 17 11%
WRITE_CALENDAR PERSONAL_INFO 17 11%
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS 13 9%
RECORD_AUDIO HARDWARE_CONTROLS 12 8%
WRITE_SMS MESSAGES 12 8%
BLUETOOTH NETWORK 11 7%
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS 10 7%
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_WRITE SYSTEM_TOOLS 10 7%
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION SYSTEM_TOOLS 9 6%
RECEIVE_SMS MESSAGES 8 5%
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN SYSTEM_TOOLS 7 5%
CAMERA HARDWARE_CONTROLS 7 5%
SEND_SMS COST_MONEY 7 5%
SET_TIME_ZONE SYSTEM_TOOLS 7 5%
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW SYSTEM_TOOLS 7 5%
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS 7 5%
READ_USER_DICTIONARY PERSONAL_INFO 6 4%
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS SYSTEM_TOOLS 5 3%
PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY SYSTEM_TOOLS 5 3%
ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION LOCATION 4 3%
CLEAR_APP_CACHE SYSTEM_TOOLS 4 3%
READ_LOGS PERSONAL_INFO 4 3%
RECEIVE_MMS MESSAGES 4 3%
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH MESSAGES 4 3%
CHANGE_WIMAX_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS 3 2%
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS PHONE_CALLS 2 1%
MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
NFC NETWORK 1 1%
REORDER_TASKS SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
USE_SIP NETWORK 1 1%
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS 0 0%
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS PERSONAL_INFO 0 0%
SET_ALWAYS_FINISH DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS 0 0%
SET_DEBUG_APP DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS 0 0%
SET_PROCESS_LIMIT DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS 0 0%
SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS 0 0%
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS PERSONAL_INFO 0 0%
“dangerous” permissions present in 150 most-installed apps
# of apps % of installed apps
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Table 7.4: Frequency of “signature” protection level permissions.
“signature” permissions present in applications 150 most-installed apps
Permission Group # of apps  % of installed apps
DEVICE_POWER 7 5%
HARDWARE_TEST HARDWARE_CONTROLS 5 3%
CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA 4 3%
FORCE_STOP_PACKAGES SYSTEM_TOOLS 4 3%
SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS SYSTEM_TOOLS 4 3%
ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER 2 1%
BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN 2 1%
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH MESSAGES 2 1%
SHUTDOWN 2 1%
ACCOUNT_MANAGER ACCOUNTS 1 1%
ASEC_ACCESS SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
ASEC_CREATE SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
ASEC_DESTROY SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
ASEC_MOUNT_UNMOUNT SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
BROADCAST_SMS MESSAGES 1 1%
CHANGE_BACKGROUND_DATA_SETTING SYSTEM_TOOLS 1 1%
INJECT_EVENTS 1 1%
INTERNAL_SYSTEM_WINDOW 1 1%
MANAGE_APP_TOKENS 1 1%
PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS 1 1%
SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER 1 1%
ASEC_RENAME SYSTEM_TOOLS 0 0%
BIND_INPUT_METHOD 0 0%
BRICK 0 0%
C2D_MESSAGE 0 0%
COPY_PROTECTED_DATA 0 0%
DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM_TOOLS 0 0%
FACTORY_TEST 0 0%
FORCE_BACK 0 0%
GLOBAL_SEARCH_CONTROL SYSTEM_TOOLS 0 0%
READ_FRAME_BUFFER 0 0%
READ_INPUT_STATE 0 0%
SET_ORIENTATION 0 0%
STATUS_BAR_SERVICE 0 0%
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Table 7.5: Frequency of “signatureOrSystem” protection level permissions.
Settings data:
When reviewing the cumulative settings data, the first observation that can be made is how 
many null values appear.  The second, somewhat shocking, observation is the number of 
different versions names reported among the 674 submitted files; 225 unique build versions were 
recorded and are available for review in Appendix A.  
Tables 7.5 and 7.6 display an aggregated subset of the data collected. As can be seen in the 
table below, of the four setting not pre-set within the framework, displaying passwords and lock-
patterns on screen when entered, enabling a screen lock patter, and enabling the transmission of 
background data, more than two-thirds of users have not actively set these options.  In addition, 
Permission Group
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS 25 17%
ACCESS_CACHE_FILESYSTEM 11 7%
MASTER_CLEAR 10 7%
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE PHONE_CALLS 9 6%
BACKUP 8 5%
CALL_PRIVILEGED 8 5%
STATUS_BAR 8 5%
ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES 7 5%
INSTALL_PACKAGES 6 4%
DELETE_PACKAGES 5 3%
REBOOT 4 3%
UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS 4 3%
BIND_WALLPAPER 3 2%
SET_WALLPAPER_COMPONENT SYSTEM_TOOLS 3 2%
BIND_APPWIDGET PERSONAL_INFO 2 1%
CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES 2 1%
DUMP PERSONAL_INFO 2 1%
GLOBAL_SEARCH SYSTEM_TOOLS 2 1%
INSTALL_LOCATION_PROVIDER 2 1%
CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE 1 1%
DELETE_CACHE_FILES 1 1%
MOVE_PACKAGE 1 1%
PERFORM_CDMA_PROVISIONING 1 1%
SET_TIME 1 1%
STOP_APP_SWITCHES 1 1%
WRITE_GSERVICES 1 1%
MANAGE_USB HARDWARE_CONTROLS 0 0%
“signatureOrSystem” permissions present in applications 150 most-installed apps
# of apps % of installed apps
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7% of devices granted root file access to the Security Test application, 11% had their Bluetooth 
radio enabled, and 51% had their Wifi radio enabled.  Almost half of all users (47%) also 
allowed their phone to install applications from locations other than the Android Marketplace.  It 
should also be noted that 20% of devices had the Android Debug Bridge setting enabled, which 
is used in conjunction with the Android SDK tools.
Table 7.6 shows the number of devices, out of a total of 385, which have the various location 
tracking capabilities enabled.  Only 26% had all location-sensing resources turned off at the time 
of the data collection.
Table 7.6: Selected settings values.
Table 7.7: Allowed location providers.
Selected settings values
Yes No null
28 7% 357 93% n/a n/a
TEXT_SHOW_PASSWORD 45 12% 75 19% 265 69%
LOCK_PATTERN_ENABLED 56 15% 43 11% 286 74%
LOCK_PATTERN_VISIBLE 56 15% 23 6% 306 79%
BLUETOOTH_ON 44 11% 341 89% n/a n/a
INSTALL_NON_MARKET_APPS 180 47% 205 53% n/a n/a
ADB_ENABLED 76 20% 309 80% n/a n/a
ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATION 57 15% 327 85% 1 0%
BACKGROUND_DATA 138 36% 2 1% 245 64%
DATA_ROAMING 118 31% 266 69% 1 0%
WIFI_ON 195 51% 190 49% n/a n/a
Granted Security Test app root access:
Location providers allowed
 network 256 66%
155 40%
 a_g_p_s 11 3%
9 2%
1 0%
 no location providers enabled 101 26%
 gps
 vzw_lbs
 garmin_network
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CHAPTER VIII
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
Prior to making a recommendation regarding the future of the Android operating system, it is 
necessary to evaluate some of the social and economic factors that also affect it.  When Google 
introduced Android they introduced a distribution and marketing model that was significantly 
different from dominant conditions present in the United States cellular phone market.  In 
particular, their first publicly-available phone, the Nexus One, was sold direct to the public for 
full value, included the ability to easily unlock the bootloader encouraging the purchaser to 
install any firmware desired, and was available with or without a carrier plan contract.10  Initially, 
the Nexus One could be purchased at a discount of $350 ($529 without or $179 with) by signing 
a two-year contract with T-Mobile.  Their carrier-independent distribution model is not 
uncommon in other parts of the world, but in the United States, the majority of devices are sold 
to consumers at a discounted price in exchange for a multi-year contract agreement and include 
hardware or software features that prevent the device from being usable with other service 
providers.  
The typical modifications made to the Android framework by manufacturers or carriers when 
being installed onto a carrier-specific phone model include applications unique to the 
manufacturer and carrier, sometimes referred to as 'bloatware.'  This is in addition to the 
necessary hardware drivers and other slight framework modifications to improve performance or 
10 http://www.google.com/intl/en/press/pressrel/20100105_phone.html
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add features.  The result of these customizations has resulted in the recording of more than 200 
different Android releases and makes it impossible for a standard Android security patch to be 
reliably pushed to all existing devices, even if they are running a specified Android version 
number.  Instead, it is the responsibility of the manufacturers and carriers that use Android to 
assure that their customers require any necessary patches.11  Additionally, the aforementioned 
bloatware is usually embedded within the framework in a manner that prevents it from being 
removed through traditional means, thus encouraging some users to look for and exploit 
vulnerabilities in order to gain administrative access over the installed software.
Another environment consideration regarding Android's usage is the development and release 
model.  As shown in Figure 8.1, the Android Open Source Project contains both proprietary 
Google development and conventional public contributions normally found in open source 
projects.  As has been seen within the past year, this parallel-branch development has resulted in 
instances of security vulnerabilities being patched within the privately developed branch with 
promises of inclusion in the next official release, while the currently available release continues 
to contain the exploitable code.  This inconsistent patching model has also resulted in a lack of 
communication regarding known exploits.
11 http://developer.android.com/guide/appendix/faq/security.html
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        Figure 8.1: Android Code Lines (http://source.android.com/source/code-lines.html)
Additionally, because each manufacturer implements device-specific versions for their own 
hardware, new devices are frequently introduced with nominal versions that are multiple 
versions behind the current existing publicly available Android Open Source Project release.  
Unfortunately, public communication regarding versions or patches released by individual 
manufacturers has not been found, so although it's possible that security patches have been 
applied to versions earlier than their incorporation into the official Android framework, there is 
no guarantee that any individual exploit has been patched without individual testing on each 
device and build.
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CHAPTER IX
PROPOSED SOLUTION
Application vetting:
Although resource-intensive and not entirely effective (Sorrel, 2010), the creation and usage 
of an application market that underwrites the security of the applications before distribution may 
be the most effective deterrent to the spread of malware, and Trojans in particular.  Evidence 
exists that the official Android Market does evaluate applications that they distribute, however 
their process and method of review remains undisclosed.  In addition, no assurance is passed on 
to the end-user, leaving them exposed to a caveat emptor-type of threat where they cannot be 
expected to have the technical proficiency to adequately evaluate their risks.
A new alternative that will apparently offer a minimal amount of application vetting will be 
offered from Amazon, as stated on their website:
4. Security issues: All applications sold by Amazon must be secure and safe for any 
phone. Security tests include making sure the app does not store passwords without the 
user's consent, does not collect data and send it to unknown servers, and does not harm 
existing data on the device.12
From the description, Amazon does review applications, however only from a user-space 
perspective, they do not require submission of source code, and it could be possible to hide 
malicious functionality that would evade the initial review.
Other alternatives to the official Android Marketplace provide various levels of service and 
12 http://developer.amazon.com/Appstore
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are available in a variety of locations, however none appear to offer a vetting process that 
exceeds Amazon's proposal.  This list of application vendors currently includes:
* http://www.appbrain.com
* http://www.andapponline.com
* http://store.androidguys.com
* http://www.mobihand.com/
* http://www.handango.com
* http://developer.motorola.com/shop4apps/ (China)
* http://goapk.com (China)
* http://android.pdassi.de (European)
* http://www.appbrain.com
* http://www.amazon.com/mobile-apps/b?ie=UTF8&node=2350149011 
Android operating system support and patching:
For new devices, it would be advisable to step users through the configuration of device 
passwords and to raise all security settings to their most secure setting, based on users propensity 
to leave default settings unchanged.  For example, by default JavaScript could be disabled in the 
embedded web browser, forcing users to lower their security settings if desired, rather than 
necessitating a higher level of security awareness to determine that less secure settings should be 
raised to a more restrictive and secure level.
Two of the four Android hardware models that have been distributed under the Google brand 
are aimed at consumers.  Unlike many other manufacturers' devices, the Google consumer 
models receive regular version updates and security patches in a manner similar to that of a 
traditional desktop operating systems.  As part of a security solution, the deployed Android 
versions should be designed such that security and upgrade patches can be distributed at an 
Android framework level from a single source, rather than requiring intervention from each 
developer who implements a version of the Android operating system.  As suggested by William 
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Enck in a recent communication with the Android security community, research could be 
conducted to establish a baseline of minimum requirements in order to facilitate such a patch 
distribution structure.13  To expand on that thought, consideration should also be given to 
extending the Android framework to provide a common API to the features that manufacturers 
and carriers commonly add to the framework prior to implementation on their branded devices.
Anti-malware (aka "Anti-Virus") sofware:
Solutions for Android users currently exist from a number of vendors, including Lookout and 
Droid Security, who are both mobile-focused companies, and F-Secure, Norton, and McAfee, 
who each have large presences in the desktop anti-malware market.  As previously mentioned, 
although potentially effective, anti-malware software is traditionally a reactionary solution, with 
the average time of 48 days from a new attack's release until it is discovered and included in 
future virus signature patches (Oberheide, 2008).  An alternative manner of virus detection 
involves the review of behavior signatures, however this approach is much more resource-
intensive and its effectiveness is reduced due to the limited resources provided to applications by 
the Android framework.  It should also be noted that cloud-based and desktop-based anti-
malware scanning solutions are also being researched by various groups to alleviate the burden 
placed on portable devices' resources.
Third-party device administration:
A novel solution being proposed is the idea of outsourcing the responsibility of a 
smartphone's system administration.  In the same manner that users are eager to utilize anti-
malware software as an 'install-and-forget' solution, it is possible that a market exists for a 
13 http://groups.google.com/group/android-security-
discuss/browse_thread/thread/7bc78e887c2c4f5b/c89a3c08cbb0b985?
lnk=gst&q=enck+#c89a3c08cbb0b985 
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complete system administrator solution.  In some cases users may expect such services from the 
phone or service vendor, however as devices increase in complexity, the ability for these 
salespeople to provide the expected level of support diminishes.  It is not unrealistic to expect 
that soon, the general population will reach the conclusion that their smartphones deserve a 
similar type of support and administration service plan that are commonly available for personal 
computers.
Education:
Like security threats in many other environments, education may prove to be the single most 
effective method in reducing the security threat exposure posed to Android device users.  If the 
answers to the Security Test quiz submissions are assumed to be an accurate indicator of 
preliminary user knowledge, the current state of security education isn't as bleak as some casual 
assessments.  With the exception of the technical Android-specific permission mechanism, most 
respondents answered the questions correctly.
The largest hurdle to the consumer education solution is the lack of motivation by the users.  
There currently exists no tangible incentive for consumers to invest their valuable time and effort 
in educating themselves about security topics.  Instead, companies that absorb the cost of cyber 
fraud have the most to gain from the education of users, and are the driving force behind the 
security education movement.
Summary:
No single solution has been identified that will definitively make Android, or any user-
administrated operating system, impervious to attack.  Instead a defense-in-depth solution is 
being proposed and new business models are being suggested to permit users the opportunity to 
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shift the burden of security away from themselves and onto more qualified individuals.  In the 
end, this solution should be considered more sustainable as the technology security landscape is 
continues to evolve and requires an ever-expanding level of education to stay current with 
developing attacks and mitigation techniques.  In addition, it should be noted that no enhanced 
solution will be adopted unless incentives outweigh the costs.
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CHAPTER X
CONCLUSION
One of the great advantages of the Android operating system is the freedom over the system 
resources granted to users, allowing them to unlock the capabilities of their devices in any way 
they see fit.  This flexibility comes at the expense of shouldering a greater burden and 
responsibility for the administration of their devices, with or without their complete 
understanding of their acquiescence of this role.  
In addition, the Android SDK and Android Market were designed to be both easy to use and 
very powerful, making it simple to design and distribute applications for the platform with a 
relatively minimal amount of experience.  This has resulted in an explosion of creative 
applications written by novices, professionals, and even criminals.  The expectation that a typical 
consumer is capable, or even aware of the need, to filter exploitable or malicious applications is 
unreasonable.  Added to this already dangerous mixture of factors is the overwhelming variety of 
Android versions and lack of continuing support for earlier-generation devices from the 
manufacturers.  The ability to distribute malicious applications to unsuspecting Android users in 
the form of a Trojan has become a trivial matter and is currently being combated only by 
reactionary methods.  
The data:
What has been empirically demonstrated is the fact that users are not using the tools at their 
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disposal.  With 87% of users not reviewing how the Security Test application was going to 
collect and use their data, and two-thirds of users leaving password settings unchanged, it is 
obvious that little incentive is being provided to users to learn and adhere to recommended 
security practices.  
It has also been shown that the plethora of recorded versions and the current environment 
that encourages various parties to create and distribute unique versions of the Android operating 
system has created a security problem.  Namely, there is currently no effective way to assure that 
a security patch can be distributed to all of the affected users, which in turn has resulted in 
inconsistent communication of threats and presumably many vulnerable users.
In the same manner, the shocking number of framework-domain Permissions requested by 
installed applications has also raised serious concerns about its effectiveness.  Based on the 
number of inaccessible or undeclared Permissions requested by third-party developers it is 
evident that many do not fully understand the mechanism or its application.  Through misuse of 
requested Permissions, developers may be inadvertently exposing users to unnecessary security 
risks.  In addition, the overuse of unneeded Permission requests may push users past their 
security cognitive or physical tolerance threshold (Josang, 2007) further diminishing the 
mechanism's effectiveness.
Although the Permission mechanism is too difficult for the average user to effectively 
understand and use, it has managed to fulfill its designed purpose.  While Permissions may not 
be evaluated by the typical person, a small subset of the population can utilize the extra 
information available with the Permission mechanism to assist in identifying malicious or 
inappropriate applications.  As was demonstrated by the discovery of the DroidDream Trojans by 
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an Android blogger only days after their release, it only takes one individual to use the available 
tools to identify and have the malicious applications removed from public access.  
Users are not stupid, they're unmotivated:
As has been discussed, users are offered no incentive to learn and implement secure 
computing practices.  Companies frequently absorb monetary losses as a service to their 
customers, further reducing a consumer's willingness to invest effort in security, but increasing 
the associated companies' interest in educating their consumers.  
The question of security usability has been a common theme within the security community 
as systems have increased in complexity.  Unfortunately, security paradigms often fail when a 
pre-set security policy is superseded by a user's current task objectives.  In order for user-
controlled security to be effective, it is necessary for security to be considered valuable task.  
Through education, the risks and threats posed to Android users can improve the significance of 
being responsible for their devices' security and thus increase the importance of the security task 
throughout the course of normal device use.  As an alternative, users should be offered a viable 
alternative for shifting their security burden to those more equipped to make educated decisions.  
Methods for achieving this goal are to use products that offer more limited capabilities, such as 
the iPhone, to actively shift the security burden to another person or product, such as a system 
administrator or anti-malware software.
Solution:
Outlined in this paper is a multi-tiered solution recommending a revised business model for 
the distribution of both the operating system and associated applications.  Possibly in response to 
recent requests and malicious attacks, Google has already started to shift to a more controlled 
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model of Android framework distribution with vendors that is expected to have a positive impact 
on the ability to reach a common denominator and allow for better distribution of bug fixes and 
security patches for the framework.  In addition to corporate actions, the usage of an available 
anti-virus application also adds low-cost security enhancement for typical users.  Finally, the 
single most effective tool, education and awareness, will continue to be disseminated through the 
media and by various other interested parties as the volume of malicious activity increases. 
Further research:
Specific additional research that would enhance the current Android security environment 
includes:
• Possible implementation solution for relabeling and reducing the scope of the broadly-
used INTERNET Permission into a finer-grained Permissions.  
• Identifying the minimum necessary requirements for creating a uniform Android 
framework that allows for the distribution of patches and updates.  This could also 
involve the splitting of the Android framework into a customizable firmware API for use 
by manufacturers and carriers which would reside below the Android developer 
framework API.
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APPENDIX A
Version Builds Reported (225 unique names from 674 submissions)
1.6; 119339; Donut 2.1-update1; DJ07; REL 2.2; 218634; REL
1.6; 1274691689; REL 2.1-update1; DL09; REL 2.2; 223106; REL
1.6; 1276006243; REL 2.1-update1; DTJF3; REL 2.2; 226611; REL
1.6; 1277951075; REL 2.1-update1; DXJF4; REL 2.2; 23; REL
1.6; 1279676276; REL 2.1-update1; DXJH1; REL 2.2; 252548; REL
1.6; 14721; REL 2.1-update1; EA28; REL 2.2; 254759; REL
1.6; 1; REL 2.1-update1; GABE; REL 2.2; 255798; REL
1.6; 20101004104906; REL 2.2; 263770; REL
1.6; 21415; REL 2.1-update1; I5503DDJH1; REL 2.2; 264707; REL
1.6; 2; REL 2.1-update1; I9000XXJM1; REL 2.2; 266215; REL
1.6; 53; REL 2.2; 272076; REL
1.6; 6267; REL 2.2; 273326; REL
1.6; 6; REL 2.1-update1; swift-100913.1716 2.2; 274424; REL
1.6; 74298; REL 2.1-update1; swift-101005.1450 2.2; 277010; REL
1.6; 74492; REL 2.1-update1; swift-101012.1144 2.2; 277230; REL
1.6; 89293; Donut 2.1-update1; swift-101202.2151 2.2; 277427; REL
1.6; Android.1.002CR.1; REL 2.1-update1; swift-101208.1421 2.2; 278359; REL
1.6; T939JE2; REL 2.1-update1; TP7d; REL 2.2; 284385; REL
1.6; V10c; REL 2.1-update1; UCJH7; REL 2.2; 290190; REL
2.0; 17572; REL 2.1-update1; UVJI6; REL 2.2; 291292; REL
2.1-update1; -AFA; REL 2.1-update1; XFJM1; REL 2.2; 291627; REL
2.1-update1; 0.58.16; REL 2.1-update1; XWJFB; REL 2.2; 293415; REL
2.1-update1; 0.58.20; REL 2.1-update1; XWJG1; REL 2.2; 294884; REL
2.1-update1; 092510; REL 2.1-update1; XWJG6; REL 2.2; 327244; REL
2.1-update1; 1.13.604; REL 2.1-update1; XWJH4; REL 2.2; 38042; REL
2.1-update1; 1.16.771.3_186175 2.1-update1; XWJH5; REL 2.2; 50454; REL
2.1-update1; 1279094174; REL 2.1-update1; XWJI1; REL 2.2; AOJP4; REL
2.1-update1; 1285164809; REL 2.1-update1; XWJI8; REL 2.2; BGJJ1; REL
2.1-update1; 1292046456; REL 2.1-update1; XWJK3; REL 2.2; BUJP7; REL
2.1-update1; 170722; REL 2.1-update1; XWJM2; REL 2.2; C8150-1C215B830; REL
2.1-update1; 179042; REL 2.1-update1; XWJM5; REL 2.2; C8150-1C228B832; REL
2.1-update1; 183733; REL 2.1-update1; XXJD2; REL 2.2; DDJP6; REL
2.1-update1; 191507; REL 2.1-update1; XXJG7; REL 2.2; dev1.20101022; REL
2.1-update1; 196735; REL 2.1; 165907; REL 2.2; DJ11; REL
2.1-update1; 199109; REL 2.1; 185970; REL 2.2; DJ26; REL
2.1-update1; 2.31.651.7_258838 2.2.1; 0; REL 2.2; DJ30; REL
2.1-update1; 2.32.651.2_282911 2.2.1; 1.1.22-MIUIDEV; REL 2.2; DXJJ1; REL
2.1-update1; 2.39.591.1_194966 2.2.1; 1296900353; REL 2.2; DXJK2; REL
2.1-update1; 20100625; REL 2.2.1; 2.3.340; REL 2.2; DXJK5; REL
2.1-update1; 20100804; REL 2.2.1; 277036; REL 2.2; DXJPA; REL
2.1-update1; 20100919; REL 2.2.1; 293608; REL 2.2; eng.a20234.20100913.16420
2.1-update1; 20101015; REL 2.2.1; 295397; REL
2.1-update1; 20101102; REL 2.2.1; 296256; REL
2.1-update1; 20101126; REL 2.2.1; 296490; REL
2.1-update1; 20101203.154933; 2.2.1; 298423; REL
2.1-update1; 216830; REL 2.2.1; 298713; REL
2.1-update1; 227575; REL 2.2.1; 299250; REL 2.2; eng.nedbal19.park.2010100
2.1-update1; 229476; REL 2.2.1; 300801; REL 2.2; eng.nedbal19.park.2010102
2.1-update1; 229746; REL 2.2.1; 301245; REL
2.1-update1; 235096; REL 2.2.1; 306462; REL
2.1-update1; 237639; REL 2.2.1; 325797; REL
2.1-update1; 252264; REL 2.2.1; 60505; REL
2.1-update1; 25914; REL 2.2.1; 75603; REL
2.1-update1; 2605; REL 2.2.1; darky910; REL
2.1-update1; 262524; REL 2.2.1; DDKA6; REL
2.1-update1; 292046478; REL 2.2.1; DL05; REL 2.2; JPJJ1; REL
2.1-update1; 3.0.1390; REL 2.2; JPJK2; REL
2.1-update1; 35377; REL 2.2; JPJPG; REL
2.1-update1; 50111906.20101129 2.2; NEJP5; REL
2.1-update1; 5915949; REL 2.2; RSJP5; REL
2.1-update1; huawei.20100927.1
2.1-update1; ihBA; REL
2.1-update1; LwBC; REL
2.2; eng.huawei.20101019.22120
2.2; eng.krishankant.singhal.2
2.2; eng.lge.20101024.011532;
2.2; eng.lge.20101029.171200;
2.2; eng.marco.hirata.20101018
2.2; eng.nikech.choi.20101011.
2.2; eng.shade.20100827.220113
2.2; eng.sohit.kumar.20101018.
2.2; eng.swapan.pati.20100926.
2.2; eng.swapan.pati.20101102.
2.2; Froyo Version 1.5.1 By DJ
2.2; hudson-20110118-193312-Tn
2.2.1; eng.aria.20101124.22281
2.2.1; eng.koush.20101212.1752
2.2.1; eng.lge.20101022.011245
2.2.1; eng.lge.20101213.161756
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APPENDIX B
Data collected via the Security Test Application
Setting Description
ANDROID_ID A 64-bit number (as a hex string) that is randomly generated on the 
device's first boot and should remain constant for the lifetime of the 
device. 
Privacy Records whether user accepted the privacy disclosure on the initial screen 
or after viewing the second page as well.
Build.VERSION.RELEASE The user-visible version string. 
Root Tests whether application is granted root access and can write a file to a 
protected area of the filesystem.
TEXT_SHOW_PASSWORD Setting to showing password characters in text editors. 
LOCK_PATTERN_ENABLED Whether autolock is enabled (0 = false, 1 = true) 
LOCK_PATTERN_VISIBLE Whether lock pattern is visible as user enters (0 = false, 1 = true) 
BLUETOOTH_ON Whether bluetooth is enabled/disabled 0=disabled. 
BLUETOOTH_DISCOVERABILITY Determines whether remote devices may discover and/or connect 
to this device. 
BLUETOOTH_DISCOVERABILITY_TIMEOUT Bluetooth discoverability timeout. 
INSTALL_NON_MARKET_APPS Whether the package installer should allow installation of apps 
downloaded from sources other than the Android Market (vending 
machine). 
ACCESSIBILITY_ENABLED If accessibility is enabled. 
ADB_ENABLED Whether ADB is enabled. 
ALLOW_MOCK_LOCATION Setting to allow mock locations and location provider status to be 
injected into the LocationManager service for testing purposes 
during application development. 
BACKGROUND_DATA Whether background data usage is allowed by the user. 
DATA_ROAMING Whether or not data roaming is enabled. 
DEFAULT_INPUT_METHOD Setting to record the input method used by default, holding the ID of 
the desired method. 
DEVICE_PROVISIONED Whether the device has been provisioned (0 = false, 1 = true) 
ENABLED_ACCESSIBILITY_SERVICES List of the enabled accessibility providers. 
ENABLED_INPUT_METHODS List of input methods that are currently enabled. 
HTTP_PROXY Host name and port for global http proxy. 
LOCATION_PROVIDERS_ALLOWED Comma-separated list of location providers that activities may 
access. 
SETTINGS_CLASSNAME Settings classname to launch when Settings is clicked from All 
Applications. 
USB_MASS_STORAGE_ENABLED USB Mass Storage Enabled.
USE_GOOGLE_MAIL If this setting is set (to anything), then all references to Gmail on the 
device must change to Google Mail. 
WIFI_ON Whether the Wi-Fi should be on. 
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WIFI_WATCHDOG_ON Whether the Wi-Fi watchdog is enabled. 
ACCELEROMETER_ROTATION Control whether the accelerometer will be used to change screen 
orientation. 
ALWAYS_FINISH_ACTIVITIES If 1, the activity manager will aggressively finish activities and 
processes as soon as they are no longer needed. 
WIFI_SLEEP_POLICY The policy for deciding when Wi-Fi should go to sleep (which will in 
turn switch to using the mobile data as an Internet connection). 
WIFI_STATIC_IP The static IP address. 
WIFI_USE_STATIC_IP Whether to use static IP and other static network attributes. 
Package Name The name of each installed package. 
Requested Permissions Array of all <uses-permission> tags included under <manifest>, 
or null if there were none for each installed package.
63
APPENDIX C
Quiz Data
Passwords
Does an Android phone come with the highest level of password 
protection pre-set?
Of course 23 32%
Not even close 41 58%
I'm not sure 7 10%
Is it possible to hide the unlock pattern while it is being entered 
on the phone's touch screen?
Of course 41 66%
No 14 23%
I'm not sure 7 11%
Are password-protected accounts more secure with frequent 
password changes?
Of course 34 62%
Not always 16 29%
The best option is to change them after each login 5 9%
Text Messages and Phone Calls
Is it possible for applications to intercept text messages from 
people in your contact list?
Yes 54 93%
No 3 5%
If they are wearing football jerseys 1 2%
What is vishing?
A video attack 17 31%
A phishing attack delivered by phone call 30 55%
A typo 8 15%
Currently, there are no known criminal attacks that involve text 
messages.
True 10 20%
False 34 67%
Not sure 7 14%
Applications
Have the applications in the official Android Market been 
screened and are they guaranteed safe to install and use?
Yes 22 35%
Nope 30 48%
I'm not sure 10 16%
Can legitimate applications pose a security threat?
Absolutely 46 81%
No 6 11%
Not sure 5 9%
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Is there a minimum number of installations and minimum user 
rating assures that an application is safe?
No, there's never a guarantee 47 89%
Yes, >250,000 installs and a user rating above 4 3 6%
Yes, >1 million installs and a user rating of 5 3 6%
The operating system (i.e. Android) is the primary means of 
securing a phone or computer against malicious applications.
True 21 42%
False 26 52%
Bodyguards are the best defense 3 6%
Basic Technical Android Features
What is Sandboxing?
A technique for isolating applications 38 76%
Android's password mechanism 9 18%
One kid blocking another's ability to shovel 3 6%
Can an application access data created by other installed apps?
In some cases 41 89%
Absolutely not 4 9%
If it asks politely 1 2%
Do permissions offer more or less control over the level of 
security offered by the application sandbox technique?
More 30 68%
Less 10 23%
Who do I call for sandbox security? 4 9%
Are developers required to use the same security certificate to 
sign all applications they develop and release through the 
Android Market, in order to trace an application back to its 
developer?
Yes 18 41%
No 21 48%
Not sure 5 11%
Permissions
Can an application's permissions be changed after installation?
Sure 28 70%
Never 12 30%
Only if your parents say so 0 0%
What happens if an application tries to use a Permission that 
wasn\'t approved during installation?
It silently fails 15 39%
The system prompts the user for action 23 61%
It gets a timeout 0 0%
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Is there any legitimate reason for an application to request the 
BRICK permission, which is designed to permanently disable 
your phone?
Yes 16 43%
No 20 54%
Only if the user is building a house 1 3%
Rooting
What does it mean to 'root' a phone?
To use it as a template for other phones 12 24%
To grant unrestricted file access 38 75%
To plant it in the backyard 1 2%
Rooting a phone will improve it's performance and battery life.
Always 12 24%
In some cases 36 73%
Only if it's watered well 1 2.00%
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APPENDIX D
Voluntarily Submitted Demographic Data
Age
no response: 4
under 18: 1
18 - 21: 3
22 - 25: 2
26 - 29: 3
30 - 34: 1
35 - 39:
40 - 49: 4
50 - 59: 2
Over 60: 1
Education
no response: 3
Some high school: 2
High school grad: 6
Some college: 2
2-yr degree: 2
4-yr degree: 4
Grad degree: 2
Gender
no response: 4
Male: 14
Female: 3
Location
no response: 2
United States: 9
Canada: 2
Mexico:
Europe: 5
Asia: 2
Australia/New Zealand:
Other: 1 
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APPENDIX E
Permission Name Permission Group Protection Level API Visibility
ACCESS_CACHE_FILESYSTEM hidden from API
ACCESS_CHECKIN_PROPERTIES
ACCESS_COARSE_LOCATION LOCATION dangerous
ACCESS_FINE_LOCATION LOCATION dangerous
ACCESS_LOCATION_EXTRA_COMMANDS LOCATION normal
ACCESS_MOCK_LOCATION LOCATION dangerous
ACCESS_NETWORK_STATE NETWORK normal
ACCESS_SURFACE_FLINGER signature
ACCESS_WIFI_STATE NETWORK normal
ACCESS_WIMAX_STATE NETWORK normal hidden from API
ACCOUNT_MANAGER ACCOUNTS signature
ASEC_ACCESS SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
ASEC_CREATE SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
ASEC_DESTROY SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
ASEC_MOUNT_UNMOUNT SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
ASEC_RENAME SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
AUTHENTICATE_ACCOUNTS ACCOUNTS dangerous
BACKUP hidden from API
BATTERY_STATS normal
BIND_APPWIDGET PERSONAL_INFO
BIND_DEVICE_ADMIN signature
BIND_INPUT_METHOD signature
BIND_WALLPAPER
BLUETOOTH NETWORK dangerous
BLUETOOTH_ADMIN SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
BRICK signature
BROADCAST_PACKAGE_REMOVED SYSTEM_TOOLS signature
BROADCAST_SMS MESSAGES signature
BROADCAST_STICKY SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
BROADCAST_WAP_PUSH MESSAGES signature
CALL_PHONE COST_MONEY dangerous
CALL_PRIVILEGED
CAMERA HARDWARE_CONTROLS dangerous
CHANGE_BACKGROUND_DATA_SETTING SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
CHANGE_COMPONENT_ENABLED_STATE
CHANGE_CONFIGURATION SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
CHANGE_NETWORK_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
CHANGE_WIFI_MULTICAST_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
CHANGE_WIFI_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
CHANGE_WIMAX_STATE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous hidden from API
CLEAR_APP_CACHE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
CLEAR_APP_USER_DATA signature
CONTROL_LOCATION_UPDATES
COPY_PROTECTED_DATA signature hidden from API
DELETE_CACHE_FILES
DELETE_PACKAGES
DEVICE_POWER signature
DIAGNOSTIC SYSTEM_TOOLS signature
DISABLE_KEYGUARD SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
DUMP PERSONAL_INFO
EXPAND_STATUS_BAR SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
FACTORY_TEST signature
FLASHLIGHT HARDWARE_CONTROLS normal
FORCE_BACK signature
FORCE_STOP_PACKAGES SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
GET_ACCOUNTS ACCOUNTS normal
GET_PACKAGE_SIZE SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
GET_TASKS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
GLOBAL_SEARCH SYSTEM_TOOLS
GLOBAL_SEARCH_CONTROL SYSTEM_TOOLS signature hidden from API
C2D_MESSAGE signature hidden from API
HARDWARE_TEST HARDWARE_CONTROLS signature
INJECT_EVENTS signature
Android Permissions (source: /base/core/res/AndroidManifest.xml, version 2.3)
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
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Android Permissions, cont.
MANAGE_ACCOUNTS ACCOUNTS dangerous
MANAGE_APP_TOKENS signature
MANAGE_USB HARDWARE_CONTROLS hidden from API
MASTER_CLEAR
MODIFY_AUDIO_SETTINGS HARDWARE_CONTROLS dangerous
MODIFY_PHONE_STATE PHONE_CALLS
MOUNT_FORMAT_FILESYSTEMS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
MOUNT_UNMOUNT_FILESYSTEMS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
MOVE_PACKAGE hidden from API
NFC NETWORK dangerous
PACKAGE_USAGE_STATS signature hidden from API
PERFORM_CDMA_PROVISIONING hidden from API
PERSISTENT_ACTIVITY SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
PROCESS_OUTGOING_CALLS PHONE_CALLS dangerous
READ_CALENDAR PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
READ_CONTACTS PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
READ_FRAME_BUFFER signature
READ_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
READ_INPUT_STATE signature
READ_LOGS PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
READ_PHONE_STATE PHONE_CALLS dangerous
READ_SMS MESSAGES dangerous
READ_SYNC_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
READ_SYNC_STATS SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
READ_USER_DICTIONARY PERSONAL_INFO dangerous hidden from API
REBOOT
RECEIVE_BOOT_COMPLETED SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
RECEIVE_MMS MESSAGES dangerous
RECEIVE_SMS MESSAGES dangerous
RECEIVE_WAP_PUSH MESSAGES dangerous
RECORD_AUDIO HARDWARE_CONTROLS dangerous
REORDER_TASKS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
RESTART_PACKAGES SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
SEND_SMS COST_MONEY dangerous
SET_ACTIVITY_WATCHER signature
SET_ALARM PERSONAL_INFO normal
SET_ALWAYS_FINISH DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS dangerous
SET_ANIMATION_SCALE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
SET_DEBUG_APP DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS dangerous
SET_ORIENTATION signature
SET_PREFERRED_APPLICATIONS SYSTEM_TOOLS signature
SET_PROCESS_LIMIT DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS dangerous
SET_TIME
SET_TIME_ZONE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
SET_WALLPAPER SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
SET_WALLPAPER_COMPONENT SYSTEM_TOOLS hidden from API
SET_WALLPAPER_HINTS SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
SHUTDOWN signature hidden from API
SIGNAL_PERSISTENT_PROCESSES DEVELOPMENT_TOOLS dangerous
STATUS_BAR
STATUS_BAR_SERVICE signature hidden from API
STOP_APP_SWITCHES hidden from API
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_READ SYSTEM_TOOLS normal
SUBSCRIBED_FEEDS_WRITE SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
SYSTEM_ALERT_WINDOW SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
UPDATE_DEVICE_STATS
USE_CREDENTIALS ACCOUNTS dangerous
USE_SIP NETWORK dangerous
VIBRATE HARDWARE_CONTROLS normal
WAKE_LOCK SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
WRITE_APN_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
WRITE_CALENDAR PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
WRITE_CONTACTS PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
WRITE_EXTERNAL_STORAGE STORAGE dangerous
WRITE_GSERVICES
WRITE_HISTORY_BOOKMARKS PERSONAL_INFO dangerous
WRITE_SECURE_SETTINGS
WRITE_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
WRITE_SMS MESSAGES dangerous
WRITE_SYNC_SETTINGS SYSTEM_TOOLS dangerous
WRITE_USER_DICTIONARY PERSONAL_INFO normal hidden from API
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
signatureOrSystem
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APPENDIX F
150 Most-installed Packages
Ranking Package Name Ranking Package Name
1 381 android 76 131 com.htc.android.htcsetupwizard
1 381 com.android.browser 77 131 com.cooliris.media
1 381 com.android.htmlviewer 78 131 com.adobe.reader
1 381 com.android.packageinstaller 79 129 com.htc.dcs.impl
1 381 com.android.phone 80 129 com.android.updater
1 381 com.android.providers.applications 81 129 com.htc.music
1 381 com.android.providers.calendar 82 129 com.htc.htcmailwidgets
1 381 com.android.providers.downloads 83 129 com.htc.provider.CustomizationSettings
1 381 com.android.providers.media 84 128 com.htc.htccalendarwidgets
1 381 com.android.providers.settings 85 128 com.htc.CustomizationSetup
1 381 com.android.providers.telephony 86 128 com.htc.htcmsgwidgets
1 381 com.android.server.vpn 87 128 com.htc.widget.clockwidget
1 381 com.android.settings 88 128 com.android.launcher
1 381 com.android.setupwizard 89 128 com.htc.htclocationservice
1 381 com.android.vending.updater 90 128 com.android.htccontacts
1 381 com.google.android.apps.uploader 91 127 com.htc.lockscreen
1 381 com.google.android.partnersetup 92 127 com.htc.provider.weather
1 381 com.google.android.talk 93 127 com.htc.AddProgramWidget
1 381 com.jeter.SecurityTest 94 127 com.htc.android.htcime
1 381 com.svox.pico 95 127 com.htc.launcher
21 380 com.android.vending 96 127 com.htc.WeatherWidget
22 379 com.android.providers.userdictionary 97 127 com.htc.album
23 379 android.tts 98 127 com.htc.htcbookmarkwidget
24 379 com.google.android.street 99 127 com.htc.dcs.service.utility
25 378 com.google.android.apps.maps 100 127 com.htc.provider.settings
26 378 com.google.android.gm 101 127 com.htc.providers.uploads
27 377 com.android.providers.drm 102 127 com.htc.android.psclient
28 373 com.google.android.youtube 103 127 com.htc.android.worldclock
29 349 com.android.certinstaller 104 127 com.htc.soundrecorder
30 344 com.android.bluetooth 105 127 com.htc.calendar
31 343 com.android.providers.contacts 106 126 com.htc
32 338 com.google.android.syncadapters.contacts 107 126 com.htc.FilePicker
33 321 com.android.calculator2 108 126 com.htc.htctwitter
34 299 com.android.mms 109 126 com.htc.htcsettingwidgets
35 291 com.android.providers.subscribedfeeds 110 126 com.htc.TwitterWidget
36 285 com.android.wallpaper.livepicker 111 126 com.htc.photo.widgets
37 284 com.android.stk 112 125 com.htc.wdm
38 270 com.google.android.voicesearch 113 125 com.android.htcdialer
39 267 com.facebook.katana 114 125 com.htc.sync.provider.weather
40 258 com.android.musicvis 115 125 com.htc.Weather
41 257 com.android.wallpaper 116 125 com.android.restartapp
42 242 com.android.calendar 117 125 com.htc.settings.accountsync
43 238 com.google.android.location 118 124 com.htc.dcs.service.stock
44 237 com.android.magicsmoke 119 124 com.htc.socialnetwork.facebook
45 215 com.google.android.providers.settings 120 123 com.qo.android.htc
46 213 com.google.android.googleapps 121 123 com.htc.MusicWidget
47 212 com.android.globalsearch 122 122 com.htc.ringtonetrimmer
48 212 com.google.android.apps.gtalkservice 123 122 com.htc.StockWidget
49 212 com.google.android.server.checkin 124 122 com.htc.streamplayer
50 210 com.google.android.providers.gmail 125 122 com.htc.socialnetwork.flickr
51 209 com.android.camera 126 122 com.htc.htcMessageUploader
52 209 com.google.android.providers.enhancedgooglesearch 127 121 com.htc.android.Stock
53 199 com.android.soundrecorder 128 121 com.htc.htcsyncwidget
54 193 com.android.music 129 120 com.htc.htccontactwidgets
55 193 com.android.voicedialer 130 115 com.htc.FriendStreamWidget
56 192 com.android.email 131 114 com.htc.android.teeter
57 191 com.broadcom.bt.app.system 132 114 com.android.alarmclock
58 180 com.android.googlesearch 133 114 com.htc.android.quicklookup
59 175 com.android.defcontainer 134 113 com.htc.WeatherWallpaper
60 173 com.google.android.providers.talk 135 113 com.android.debugtool
61 172 com.android.contacts 136 113 com.htc.friendstream
62 170 com.google.android.feedback 137 111 com.htc.copyright
63 170 com.google.android.googlequicksearchbox 138 109 com.htc.fm
64 169 com.google.android.syncadapters.calendar 139 106 com.htc.android.htcime.misc
65 169 com.google.android.gsf 140 106 com.htc.appsharing
66 168 com.google.android.providers.subscribedfeeds 141 106 com.htc.flashlight
67 153 com.swype.android.inputmethod 142 105 com.google.android.backup
68 147 com.google.android.apps.genie.geniewidget 143 104 com.google.zxing.client.android
69 147 com.google.android.location 144 104 com.htc.android.calculator.widget
70 135 com.htc.fieldtest 145 104 com.htc.android.locationpicker
71 135 com.amazon.mp3 146 104 com.htc.weather.agent
72 135 com.adobe.flashplayer 147 102 com.htc.UpgradeSetup
73 134 com.htc.android.mail 148 102 com.htc.FMRadioWidget
74 132 com.android.providers.htcCheckin 149 101 com.lookout
75 132 com.android.inputmethod.latin 150 100 com.htc.socialnetwork.provider
Number of Installs on 
Unique Devices
Number of Installs on 
Unique Devices
